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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Corporations-Dissolution at Instance of Minority Stockholders
At one time minority stockholders were unable under any circum-
stances to sue for and obtain a dissolution of winding up1 of a corpora-
tion and a distribution of its assets. It was uniformly2 held that courts
of equity, by virtue of their lack of inherent power, i.e, lack of power
absent statutory delegation,3 were incapable of affording such drastic
relief-' in a suit from that quarter.5
Prior to the widespread enactment of general incorporation laws, one
of the reasons for the rule was that the corporate charter was a special
dispensation of the State-from which it was inferred that only the
State could revoke it. But the deep entrenchment of the rule and the
uniformity of its application were ultimately due in large measure to
the then extreme rarity of corporate abuses that would justify dissolu-
tion, in contrast to the abundance of circumstances for which a lesser
remedy, or no remedy at all, would be suitable. This extreme dispro-
portion served as a basis upon which the courts confounded the alleged
lack of power with the undesirability of exercising it in a great majority
of cases.0 Thus the courts arrived, by way of an overweening generali-
zation, at a rule which was categorical both in statement and applica-
tion; but which in statement was essentially unsound, and in application
occasionally unjust.
That courts of equity do have the power in the absence of statute to
dissolve or wind up a corporation and distribute its assets at the instance
of minority stockholders is strikingly illustrated by decisions repudiating
the old view, handed down in jurisdictions whose previous adherence to
that view had been undeviating.7 These courts which have reversed
their positions together with others, which on first impression have
adopted the new rule, now constitute a majority. 8 Under this common
' The distinction between winding up and dissolution is formal only; in either
case the corporate existence is effectively terminated. See Verplanck v. Mercantile
Ins. Co., 2 Paige 438, 452 (N. Y. 1831).
'The first case to hold to the contrary was decided in 1892. Miner v. Belle
Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N. W. 218 (1892).
' The first statute of this kind was enacted in 1848. 11 & 12 Vict., c. 45, §5 (8)
(1848). The earliest enactment in this country was prior to 1868. W. VA. CoDE
c. 53, §57 (1868).
'The appointment of a temporary receiver is a common example of a less dras-
tic measure of relief.
Hardon v. Newton, 11 Fed. Cas. 500, No. 6,054 (C. C. Conn. 1878); Wheeler
v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197, 32 N. E. 420, 17 L. R. A. 818 (1892) ;
Bayless v. Orne, Freem. Ch. 161 (Miss. 1840) ; Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co.,
1 Edw. Ch. 84 (N. Y. 1831); Strong v. McCogg, 55 Wis. 624, 13 N. W. 895
(1882).
'See Note, 43 A. L. R. 242, 288 (1926).
SEg., compare the following cases with cases from the same jurisdictions
cited in note 5 supra: Potter v. Victor Page Motors Corp., 300 Fed. 885 (D. Conn.
1924); Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co. v. Middendorf, 171 Ky. 771, 188 S. W. 790
(1916) ; Brent v. B. E. Brister Sawmill Co., 103 Miss. 876, 60 So. 1018 (1913);
Goodwin v. von Cotzhausen, 171 Wis. 351, 177 N. W. 618 (1920).
' Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse, 40 CoL. L. REv. 220 (1940).
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law view it has been held that the court has power to wind up a cor-
poration in a variety of appropriate circumstances, including, separately
or immingled, gross mismanagement,9 deadlock,10 fraud, 1 abandonment
of the corporate functions,'12 and failure of the corporation's principal
object or purpose.13  Most of the jurisdictions which assert a lack of
power "in the absence of statute," along with those recognizing an in-
herent power, have enacted statutes specifying grounds-the aforemen-
tioned14 and/or others' 5-upon which suit may be brought.
The power must be exercised cautiously,16 and its exercise is pro-
hibited where a lesser remedy would be adequate. 17 Accordingly, the
cases are legion where the courts, while acknowledging the power to
dissolve in an appropriate case, refuse to exercise it because such a case
has not been made out.' 8
In a recent Virginia case'9 minority stockholders of a corporation,
organized for the principal purpose of conducting a leaf tobacco busi-
ness, brought suit for dissolution alleging that the principal purpose had
9 E.g., Klugh v. Coronaca Milling Co., 66 S. C. 100, 44 S. E. 566 (1903).
20E.g., In re Dissolution of the Waldorf Amusement Co., 13 Ohio App. 438(1920).19 E.g, Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. of W. Va. v. Piedmont Coal Co.,
64 F. 2d 817 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 675 (1933).
"
2E..g, Central Land Co. v. Sullivan, 152 Ala. 360 44 So. 644 (1907).
"Riley v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 525, 155 Pac. 665 (1916) ; Kroger
v. Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 248 N. Y. Supp. 387 (1st Dep't 1931). See Hall
v. City Park Brewing Co., 294 Pa. 127, 136-137, 143 Atl. 582, 585 (1928).
LC. CoRP. CODE §4651 (1947) (abandonment, deadlock, fraud); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §5226 (1949) (fraud, gross mismanagement, abandonment), ILL. ANN.
STAT. c. 32, §157.86 (1935) (deadlock, fraud); LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. §1135 (1939)
(failure of objects, abandonment, deadlock); ME. REv. STAT. c. 49 §100 (1944)
(fraud, gross mismanagement); MINN. STAT. §301.49 (Henderson 1945) (failure
of objects, abandonment, fraud, deadlock, mismanagement) ; Mo. Rav. STAT. ANN.
§4997.88 (1939) (fraud, deadlock); NEv. Comp. LAWS ANN. §1648.01 (Supp.
1942) (fraud, gross mismanagement, abandonment); OHio GEN. CODE ANN. §8623-
86 (1938) (deadlock, abandonment, failure of objects) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§1.195 (Supp. 1948) (failure of objects, abandonment, deadlock) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §2852-1107 (1938) (failure of objects, abandonment, fraud, deadlock)
R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 116, §57 (1938), as amended, R I. Acts 1945 c. 1610 (fraud);
VA. CODE ANN. §3810b (Supp. 1948) (failure of principal purpose); WASH.
REV. STAT. ANN. §3803-50 (Supp. 1932) (failure of objects, abandonment, dead-
lock).
1 CAL. CoRP. CoDE §4651 (1947) (liquidation reasonably necessary to protect
stockholder's interests) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. §5226 (1949) (any good and sufficient
reason); ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 32, §157.86 (1935) (misapplication and waste of
assets); IOWA CODE §491.66 (1946) (good cause) ; ME. REV. STAT. c. 49, §100
(1944) (imminent danger of insolvency) ; Nmv. CoMP. LAWS §1648.01 (collusion,
misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance); N. D. RmV. CoDE §10-1607 (1943) (one
year suspension of ordinary business); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §1.195 (Supp.
1948) (beneficial to interests of stockholders); S. C. CODE ANN. §7725 (1942)
(nonpayment of dividends or inability to pay dividends in good faith over stated
intervals) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. §3093 (1) (1943) (sufficient cause).
" See discussion in Goodwin v. von Cotzhausen, 171 Wis. 351, 361, 177 N. W.
618, 622 (1920).1 7Thwing v. Minowa Co., 134 Minn. 148, 158, N. W. 820 (1916).
"
8E.g. Penn v. Pemberton & Penn, Inc., 189 Va. 649, 53 S. E. 2d 823 (1949).
" Penn v. Pemberton & Penn, Inc., 189 Va. 649, 53 S. E. 2d 823 (1949).
[Vol. 28
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failed. It was shown that the majority stockholders in control had
suspended the tobacco business during the war period-when that busi-
ness was highly speculative-and during the postwar period of inflation,
and had invested the corporation's idle capital, profitably, in stocks and
bonds. The court held that although by the general rule, of which the
statute20 in part is declaratory,21 a court of equity has inherent power
to dissolve a solvent corporation because of fraud or gross mismanage-
ment or failure of the corporate purpose, dissolution was not warranted
by the facts presented. The case- is significant inasmuch as it expressly
recognizes that a court of equity has the power to dissolve independently
of statute, and that the exercise of the power depends upon the appli-
cation of general principles of equity to the merits of the case.
North Carolina has provided by statute22 certain general and spe-
cific grounds upon which dissolution may be granted in suits instituted
therefor by minority stockholders. These include (1) abuse of the cor-
porate powers to the injury of stockholders, (2) nonuser of the corpo-
rate powers for two or more consecutive years, (3) suspension of
ordinary business for want of funds, or imminent danger of insolvency,
and (4) nonpayment of dividends for certain intervals. But certain of
the grounds enumerated above, viz., fraud, gross mismanagement, dead-
lock, and abandonment 28 for less than a two year period, for which the
remedy is commonly available in appropriate cases in most jurisdictions,
are either excluded completely or subject to inclusion only by future
construction of the statute. Fraud very probably is an abuse of the
corporate powers within the meaning of the statute;24 but it would be
more difficult to find that the same is true of gross mismanagement
where fraud is lacking. Both deadlock and abandonment for less than
two years are distinctly without the purview of the statute, and failure
of the corporate purposes is at best only partially embraced.
The question whether in North Carolina equity has "power" to dis-
solve or, more accurately, will recognize its power to dissolve, in the
absence of statutorily specified circumstances, is therefore one of practi-
cal moment.
Although there are no holdings on the question, 25 there is one state-
ment by a dissenting judge, uttered at a time when the weight of au-
2 VA. CODE ANN. §3810b (Supp. 1948).
" Penn v. Pemberton & Penn, Inc., 53 S. E. 2d 823, 825 (Va. 1949).
12 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§55-124, 55-125 (1943).
"' Abandonment is the critical fact; nonuser, except under statutory provision,
is merely evidence of it. Sullivan v. Central Land Co., 173 Ala. 426, 55 So. 612
(1911).
2" In one case, however, where fraud was clearly present, but where imminency
of insolvency was not so clearly present, the court, in appointing a receiver, rested
its decision on the latter basis, neglecting to construe the "abuse of power" pro-
vision. Mitchell v. Aulander Realty Co., 169 N. C. 516, 86 S. E. 358 (1915).
" Contra: Note, 34 VA. LAw REv. 56, 57 (1948).
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thority was in the process of shifting,2 6to the effect that ". . . it is well
settled . .. that in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary,
only the State which created the corporation can sue to dissolve it."127
Cited in support of the contention that the rule is well settled are one
treatise 2s and four North Carolina cases.2 9 The writer of the treatise
asserts that equity has, as a general rule, no power or jurisdiction to
dissolve, in the absence of statute, upon the suit of minority stock-
holders,3 0 but lists, with evident approbation, several exceptional cir-
cumstances (including most of the aforementioned appropriate grounds)
in which equity may properly exercise that power.3 ' Thus the writer,
by admitting the "exceptions," admits the existence of the power, but
in his statement of the "general" rule, with regard to the reason why
dissolution should not be granted in inappropriate cases, seems to be
involved in the persistent verbal confusion between the existence of the
power and the desirability of exercising it.
The dissenting statement finds even less support in the cases cited.
In two 2 of these, suits were brought by minority stockholders for dis-
solution on statutory grounds, but no statement appears which negates,
either expressly or by implication, equity's power in the absence of
statute.33 The other two cases, 34 although they contain statements os-
tensibly applicable upon inspection, in fact involve suits brought by par-
ties other than those interested in the corporation for a remedy unrelated
to dissolution, and are as distinctly irrelevant in law as in fact to the
"well settled" rule which they were cited to support.3 5
26 Compare Note, 19 IowA LAW REv. 95 (1933), with Hornstein, A Remedyfor Corporate Abuse, 40 COL. LAW REV. 220 (1940). For observations that the
rule had previously changed, see Hall v. City Park Brewing Co., 294 Pa. 127,
132-133, 143 Atl. 582, 583-584 (1928) ; Goodwin v. von Cotzhausen, 171 Wis. 351,
358-361, 177 N. W. 618, 621-622 (1920) ; BALLENTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §253
(1927).
"
7See Kistler v. The Caldwell Cotton Mills Co., 205 N. C. 809, 814, 172 S. E.
373, 375 (1933) (dissenting opinion).
" 16 FLETCHER, CoRPoRATIoNs (1933 ed.) §8077.
29 Lasley v. Mercantile Co., 179 N. C. 575, 103 S. E. 213 (1920) ; Lasley v.
Scales, 179 N. C. 578, 103 S. E. 214 (1920) ; Bass v. Navigation Co., 111 N. C. 439,
16 S. E. 402 (1892) ; Torrence v. Charlotte, 163 N. C. 562, 80 S. E. 53 (1913).
16 FLETCHER, CoRPoRATIONs (Perm. ed.) §§8080, 8098.
16 id. §§8080, 8081, 8082, 8098.
2 Lasley v. Mercantile Co., 179 N. C. 575, 103 S. E. 213 (1920); Lasley v.
Scales, 179 N. C. 578, 103 S. E. 214 (1920).
" Indeed, a statement in the earlier of these two cases may be, and has been,
interpreted as a recognition of equity's power in the absence of statute. See 19
C. J. S. Corporations §1716 (1940).
"4 Torrence v. Charlotte, 163 N. C. 562, 80 S. E. 53 (1913) ; Bass v. Navigation
Co., 111 N. C. 439, 16 S. E. 402 (1892).
" The later case merely quotes the pertinent statements of the earlier one. The
facts of both cases were essentially the same. The grantors of land (under eminent
domain proceedings) to the defendant corporations sued to recover the land, alleg-
ing that the existence of the corporations had been terminated, and thus their char-
ters forfeited, by virtue of changes in the originally chartered purposes for which
the land had been taken. Thus, when the court says in Bass v. Navigation Co.,
supra, note 12, at p. 449, "It rests with the sovereign to insist upon the forfeiture
[Vol. 28
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Another case,3 6 wherein dissolution was granted under circumstances
encompassed by statutory provision,37 but wherein proceedings had not
been brought pursuant to the statute, might plausibly stand for the
proposition that dissolution may be granted independently of statute,
and hence for the principle that equity has power in the absence of
statute. That the action, although brought in equity, was brought on -a
statutory ground, and was for that reason3s entertained or condoned by
the court, might suggest a contrary inference.
The justice and equity of dissolution in proper cases may be founded
on principles of trust and contract. The tenet of majority rule in cor-
porate management is qualified by an implicit trust relationship between
the directors, or the majority stockholders, and the individual stock-
holder. Accordingly, it is the duty of those in control to manage the
corporate affairs honestly for the benefit of all concerned-not merely
for the benefit of the majority or controlling interests.3 9 Consequently,
if the corporate objects fail, if the corporate functions are abandoned,
or if the corporation is doomed to eventual insolvency, that duty is
breached by a failure to wind up the corporation. Otherwise, the stock-
holder's investment would probably be subject, not merely to futile stag-
nation, but to the various intrigues of the controlling interests, and to
progressive dissipation in taxes and salaries.
The pertinent principle of contract is that by which one party has
the right to "rescind (e.g., withdraw from the corporation) after the
other has persistently failed to comply with his part of the contract (e.g.,
refused to act in the collective interest of the group)."40
The contention that the power can be abused is perhaps the most
persistent objection to it. But difficult as it is to foresee general conse-
quences in matters of this kind, it would be still more difficult to see
how judicial abuses of the power, as cautiously as it has been exercised
for failure on the part of the corporation to comply with its charter . . . .", and at
p. 454, ". . . only the sovereign state itself can demand the forfeiture and assert its
right to dissolve the corporation. . . .", it is saying merely that the corporate exist-
ence is not subject to collateral attack by a logically disinterested party; i.e., that
as between the state and such a party, the power to dissolve rests exclusively in the
state, and has no bearing on that party's rights. The existence of the statute recog-
nizing the right of minority stockholders to sue for dissolution in certain circum-
stances renders it particularly obvious that the court was not denying that right.
" Greenleaf v. Land & Lumber Co., 146 N. C. 505, 60 S. E. 424 (1908).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-124 (2) (1943) (nonuser of powers for two or more
years).
" "WAle can perceive no good reason, however, for dismissing this action, wherein
all parties in interest are now or, under his Honor's order, will be brought into
court and the same relief awarded as if the provisions of the statute had been
complied with." Greenleaf v. Land & Lumber Co., 146 N. C. 505, 507-508, 60
S. E. 424, 425 (1908).3o See, e.g., Altoona Warehouse Co. v. Bynum, 242 Ala. 540, 545-546, 7 So.
2d 497, 502-503 (1942) ; Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 109-110, 114-115,
53 N. W. 218, 222, 224 (1892) ; Note, 41 MIcH L. REv. 714, 716 (1943).
" Hornstein, A Reinedey for Corporate Abuse, 40 COL. L. REv. 220, 225 (1940).
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in the past,41 could approach the intracorporate abuses rendered per-
petrable by non-recognition or denial of the power.42
Thus far, the only situations to arise in which the courts have
deemed it just and equitable to decree dissolution have arisen within
the categories already mentioned. But these categories are mere col-
lections of abuses already presented rather than inflexible limits of the
rule; so that the real reason for applying the remedy in a particular case
is now, as it was initially, that such action is just, equitable,48 and so-
cially desirable.
As previously noted, all the presently appropriate circumstances for
dissolution are not covered by statute in North Carolina. If they were,
then it would, presently, make no practical difference whether the court
had "inherent power" or not; in that event the question would, for the
time being, be academic. The history of the remedy, however, has
shown that the growth of circumstances warranting dissolution is con-
comitant with the growth and variegation of corporate activity. Assum-
ing that this concomitancy will continue, statutory coverage of the
ground, however liberal, must assuredly lag behind the evolving demands
of justice and equity 44 It is hoped, therefore, that when confronted
with an appropriate case the court will recognize and exercise its in-
herent power, refusing to construe the statute as exclusive.4 5
PARKER WHEDON.
Damages-Mental Anguish-Action Arising Out of Contract
Plaintiff contracted with the defendant undertakers to bury plain-
tiff's deceased husband. Approximately four months after internment,
" Decisions refusing to decree dissolution, even in jurisdictions which recog-
nize the power, disproportionately exceed the decisions granting the remedy.
2 'Alternative judgments to the effect that complainant be paid his pro rata
share of the assets (or the "fair cash value" of his stock) or that the corporation
be dissolved, may be a solution to this problem. CoNN. GEN. STAT. §5228 (1949) ;
W. VA. CODE ANN. §3093 (1943) ; Riley v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 525,
155 Pac. 665 (1916).
"' The Companies Act of England provides for winding up where "..the court
is of opinion it is just and equitable. . . ." The Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20
Geo. V, c. 23, §168 (6).
"There is, however, one adequate statutory solution to the problem. By a
Rhode Island enactment it has been expressly provided that the grounds for dis-
solution specified in the statute are not to be construed as limits on the general
equity powers of the court and that the same relief may be obtained in equity.
R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 116, §§61, 62 (1938).
4' Analagous grounds for such refusal may be found in the case of it re Hotel
Raleigh, 207 N. C. 521, 528-529, 177 S. E. 648, 652 (1935), where, in a proceeding
under statute for the appointment of a receiver, the court said, "We do not hold
that, in a proper case, the superior court of this state, in the exercise of its equi-
table jurisdiction, is without power to appoint a receiver of a corporation, whose
business has been improperly conducted, with resulting loss to its creditors or
stockholders, because of irreconcilable dissensions among its stockholders or di-
rectors. . . . We hold only that, in the summary proceeding provided by C. S.
§1177, the judge of the superior court is without such power."
[Vol. 28
